Publications
Of Providence and Puppet Shows: Divine Hiddenness as Kantian Theodicy
Faith and Philosophy (forthcoming)
Although the free-will reply to divine hiddenness is often associated with Kant, the argument typically presented in the literature is not the strongest Kantian response. Kant’s central claim is not that knowledge of God would preclude the possibility of transgression, but rather that it would preclude one’s viewing adherence to the moral law as a genuine sacrifice of self-interest. After explaining why the Kantian reply to hiddenness is superior to standard formulations, I argue that, despite Kant’s general skepticism about theodicy, his insights pertaining to hiddenness also provide the foundation for a new theodicy that merits serious attention.
Intrinsic Valuing and the Limits of Justice: Why the Ring of Gyges Matters
(co-authored with Nicholas Baima)
Phronesis (forthcoming)
Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and Christopher Shields (2006) claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic II cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges’ behavior, it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain.
God's Awful Majesty Before Our Eyes: Kant's Moral Justification for Divine Hiddenness
Kantian Review 22.1 (2017) 133-157
The problem of ‘divine hiddenness’ arises from the lack of an explanation for why an all-loving God would choose not to make his existence evident. I argue that Kant provides a compelling solution to this problem in an often overlooked passage located near the end of the second Critique. Kant’s suggestion is that God’s revealing himself would preclude the development of virtue because we would lose the experience of conflict between self-interest and the law. I provide a reconstruction and defence of Kant’s argument, and I explain why it is consistent with his overall position in the second Critique.
Rational Beings with Emotional Needs: The Patient-Centered Grounds of Kant's Duty of Humanity
History of Philosophy Quarterly 32.4 (2015) 353-376
In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant claims we have a duty to cultivate and use sympathetic feelings “as a means of promoting active and rational benevolence” (MS 6:457). Kant labels this the “duty of humanity,” and he suggests that nature has implanted sympathetic feelings in us “to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish” (MS 6:457). While these remarks make it clear that feelings such as sympathy have a role to play in Kant’s ethics, it is not obvious exactly what this role is or what the value of sympathy consists in. I argue that in order to fully understand the Kantian value of sympathy we must shift our focus away from the psychology of moral agents and towards the emotional needs of moral patients. I propose that Kant’s duty of humanity is grounded in the fact that receiving expressions of sympathy is an important human need.
Sometimes Psychopaths Get it Right: A Utilitarian Response to 'The Mismeasure of Morals'
Utilitas 26.2 (2014) 178-191
A well-publicized study titled ‘The Mismeasure of Morals’ (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011) purportedly provides evidence that utilitarian solutions to a particular class of moral dilemmas are endorsed primarily by individuals with psychopathic traits. According to the authors, these findings give researchers reason to refrain from classifying utilitarian judgements as morally optimal. This article is a two-part response to the study. The first
part comprises concerns about the methodology used and the adequacy of the data for supporting the authors’ conclusions. The second part seeks to undermine the suggestion that if anti-social individuals are the ones most likely to endorse utilitarian solutions to the target dilemmas, we should be skeptical about those solutions. I argue that the character of individuals most likely to make a given moral judgement is an unreliable indicator of the quality of that judgement.
Review of The Cosmos of Duty: Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics, by Roger Crisp
Journal of Moral Philosophy 12:2 (2018) 233-236.
Review of Preferences and Well-Being, edited by Serena Olsaretti
Journal of Value Inquiry 43:2 (2009) 273-279
Faith and Philosophy (forthcoming)
Although the free-will reply to divine hiddenness is often associated with Kant, the argument typically presented in the literature is not the strongest Kantian response. Kant’s central claim is not that knowledge of God would preclude the possibility of transgression, but rather that it would preclude one’s viewing adherence to the moral law as a genuine sacrifice of self-interest. After explaining why the Kantian reply to hiddenness is superior to standard formulations, I argue that, despite Kant’s general skepticism about theodicy, his insights pertaining to hiddenness also provide the foundation for a new theodicy that merits serious attention.
Intrinsic Valuing and the Limits of Justice: Why the Ring of Gyges Matters
(co-authored with Nicholas Baima)
Phronesis (forthcoming)
Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and Christopher Shields (2006) claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic II cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges’ behavior, it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain.
God's Awful Majesty Before Our Eyes: Kant's Moral Justification for Divine Hiddenness
Kantian Review 22.1 (2017) 133-157
The problem of ‘divine hiddenness’ arises from the lack of an explanation for why an all-loving God would choose not to make his existence evident. I argue that Kant provides a compelling solution to this problem in an often overlooked passage located near the end of the second Critique. Kant’s suggestion is that God’s revealing himself would preclude the development of virtue because we would lose the experience of conflict between self-interest and the law. I provide a reconstruction and defence of Kant’s argument, and I explain why it is consistent with his overall position in the second Critique.
Rational Beings with Emotional Needs: The Patient-Centered Grounds of Kant's Duty of Humanity
History of Philosophy Quarterly 32.4 (2015) 353-376
In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant claims we have a duty to cultivate and use sympathetic feelings “as a means of promoting active and rational benevolence” (MS 6:457). Kant labels this the “duty of humanity,” and he suggests that nature has implanted sympathetic feelings in us “to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish” (MS 6:457). While these remarks make it clear that feelings such as sympathy have a role to play in Kant’s ethics, it is not obvious exactly what this role is or what the value of sympathy consists in. I argue that in order to fully understand the Kantian value of sympathy we must shift our focus away from the psychology of moral agents and towards the emotional needs of moral patients. I propose that Kant’s duty of humanity is grounded in the fact that receiving expressions of sympathy is an important human need.
Sometimes Psychopaths Get it Right: A Utilitarian Response to 'The Mismeasure of Morals'
Utilitas 26.2 (2014) 178-191
A well-publicized study titled ‘The Mismeasure of Morals’ (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011) purportedly provides evidence that utilitarian solutions to a particular class of moral dilemmas are endorsed primarily by individuals with psychopathic traits. According to the authors, these findings give researchers reason to refrain from classifying utilitarian judgements as morally optimal. This article is a two-part response to the study. The first
part comprises concerns about the methodology used and the adequacy of the data for supporting the authors’ conclusions. The second part seeks to undermine the suggestion that if anti-social individuals are the ones most likely to endorse utilitarian solutions to the target dilemmas, we should be skeptical about those solutions. I argue that the character of individuals most likely to make a given moral judgement is an unreliable indicator of the quality of that judgement.
Review of The Cosmos of Duty: Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics, by Roger Crisp
Journal of Moral Philosophy 12:2 (2018) 233-236.
Review of Preferences and Well-Being, edited by Serena Olsaretti
Journal of Value Inquiry 43:2 (2009) 273-279